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Geopolitical Influences on the Future of Renminbi 
John Ryan  
The Chinese government has made great 
strides in its ambition to turn the 
Renminbi into a global reserve currency. 
The importance of Europe to China’s 
economy is unquestionable, so Brexit is an 
unwelcomed event. China’s resolve to 
reduce its US Dollar exposure has 
intensified following the election of 
Donald Trump as president. This political 
friction has reinforced concern by China 
that the US could intentionally slip into a 
situation in which a trade war occurs. Such 
a trade war between China and the US 
could have a detrimental effect on the 
global economy. 
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for international transaction purposes for 
other countries. Eventually, it may also be 
used as a unit of account for cross-border 
credit, debt and loan transaction purposes. For 
example, some of the loans to be made by the 
Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank (AIIB) 
can be denominated in whole or in part in 
RMB if the borrowers so wish; and some of 
the long-term projects under the ‗One Belt, 
One Road‘ initiative can be partially financed 
through the issuance of Renminbi-
denominated bonds.  
 
The People‘s Bank of China (PBOC) has 
adopted a policy of bilateral central bank swap 
arrangements which focuses on three major 
objectives: strengthening trade following the 
global financial crisis, shaping an RMB 
currency zone and encouraging the growth of 
RMB deposits in foreign central banks. 
 
China has also stepped up purchases of Euro-
denominated assets and boosted monetary 
relations with European central banks through 
currency-swap agreements and RMB bank 
clearing. More than 50 central banks have so 
far added the Chinese currency to their 
portfolios as growing trade ties and reforms by 
China are leading reserve managers to view it 
as a viable reserve currency. Most of Europe‘s 
major central banks have added, or are 
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CHINA’S RENMINBI AMBITIONS 
The Renminbi is on course to become a major 
international currency for transaction 
purposes. It will be increasingly used in 
international transactions involving Chinese 
nationals as one or both of the transacting 
parties. Over time, it may even be used in 
transactions between third-party countries, 
especially those that run a trade surplus vis-à-
vis China and hence have a ready source for 
Renminbi balances. What the Renminbi needs 
to do is hold its exchange rate steady and not 
to adjust its value abruptly. By reducing its 
volatility relative to the US Dollar, the 
Renminbi can become the preferred currency 
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considering adding, the RMB to their 
portfolio, often at the expense of the Dollar. 
  
RMB internationalization has increasingly fed 
offshore centres such as London and 
Singapore. When it comes to handling global 
payments in RMB, Hong Kong still takes the 
lion‘s share with over 70 percent of the market 
by value.  
 
In November 2014, the ECB decided to add 
the RMB to its foreign-currency reserves. 
China entered into a very large currency swap 
agreement with the Eurozone which will allow 
more trade and investment between the 
regions to be conducted in Euro and RMB, 
without having to convert into another 
currency such as the US Dollar. This 
agreement will result in a reduction of US 
Dollars being used in trade between China and 
Europe. China currently owns about US$1.3 
trillion of US debt, and this enormous 
exposure to US debt has become a major 
political issue among the country‘s leadership.  
 
The PBOC has also designated a number of 
RMB clearing banks as RMB Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors (RQFII). Half 
of these ―RMB hubs‖ are in Europe, including 
in London, Frankfurt, Paris, Luxembourg and 
Prague. On 21 January 2015, China‘s and 
Switzerland‘s central banks signed an RQFII 
agreement, making Zurich another hub for 
RMB trading. 
 
China‘s ultimate goal is to make the RMB one 
of the main currencies for global trade and to 
place limits on the role of the US Dollar in the 
international monetary system. Since 2008, 
Chinese officials and scholars have maintained 
that the USA is abusing its position as 
controller of the main reserve currency by 
pursuing irresponsible economic policies. An 
op-ed by Xinhua agency on 22 October 2013 
did not hesitate to call for a ―de-
Americanized‖ world.1  
 RENMINBI AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL 
China's designs for the RMB are being shaped 
by foreign policy rather than macroeconomics. 
In a nutshell, the country wants to create an 
RMB zone in Asia, together with a larger RMB 
segment in global finance. The principal 
instruments include the internationalization of 
the RMB in currency trading; the settlement 
and denomination of trade and capital 
transactions; and backing for a new financial 
architecture.  Yet, success to gain global 
reserve currency status cannot be taken for 
granted. 
          
First, even though China will soon be the 
biggest global economy and already is the 
biggest exporting nation, it does not follow 
that the rest of the world will want to 
accumulate RMB claims on China as their 
principal reserve assets. To have a reserve 
currency, a high degree of internationalization 
is essential. But you also need fundamentals 
that China will be slow or reluctant to provide: 
a totally flexible exchange rate, unrestricted 
inward and outward capital flows, and open, 
liquid and trusted capital markets that rest on 
the rule of law. 
 
Second, to groom a reserve currency, 
foreigners have to be allowed to acquire RMB 
claims on China in either of two ways: through 
a current account deficit, which China does 
not have and may not have for a long time, or 
through an open capital account, in which 
capital flows freely in and out of the country. 
China will run a current account deficit if and 
when domestic investment exceeds savings, 
but it still has excess savings, and its current 
economic rebalancing is designed to lower 
investment. So its external surplus is unlikely 
to disappear soon. 
 
Third, capital account liberalization is a central 
goal of the government, but neither the central 
bank's 2012 timetable envisaging full RMB 
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convertibility by 2015-2017, nor the creation in 
2013 of a Shanghai free trade zone -- designed 
as a pilot for convertibility -- have lived up to 
expectations. The Stock Connect programme 
is a modest and important step to liberalize 
capital flows, but like so many others, it is 
likely to prove incremental, and slow. 
 
China has chosen not to disclose exactly the 
size of its gold holdings. A gold-backed RMB 
would need to surpass the Federal Reserve‘s 
official, but unaudited, gold holding of 8133.5 
tons. This would be a game changer as far as 
the US Dollar continuing to be the global 
reserve currency is concerned. The US Dollar 
will not be replaced overnight, but the 
incremental policy initiatives by China show 
that there will be a gradual move over the next 
ten years to a multipolar currency regime. 
Meanwhile, the use of the RMB as a reserve 
currency or as a trading currency will slowly 
rise, especially with its entry to the IMF Special 
Drawing Rights basket. 
 
China, along with other countries, continues to 
raise questions about the dominance of the US 
Dollar and the need for an alternative 
monetary system. China‘s resolve to reduce its 
US Dollar exposure has intensified following 
the election of Donald Trump as president. 
This political friction has reinforced concern 
by China that the US could intentionally slip 
into a situation in which a trade war occurs. 
Such a trade war between China and the US 
could have a detrimental effect on the global 
economy.  
 
The US has been concerned that the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will act 
as an instrument of Chinese foreign policy, as 
has the US-led World Bank since it was 
founded in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. The UK‘s then-Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, George Osborne, announced on 
12 March 2015 that the UK intended to 
become a prospective founding member of the 
AIIB. In doing so, the UK was the first major 
developed country to seek to join the AIIB. 
France, Italy and Germany then followed, 
leaving the US looking isolated. While the US 
views China as a geopolitical rival, with the two 
powers now vying for supremacy in the Pacific 
basin, European nations are more mindful of 
the importance of China as an existing and 
future trading partner.2  
 
The Washington-based IMF said it would, 
despite earlier opposition, be ―delighted‖ to 
cooperate with the AIIB.3  Japan, the US‘s 
staunchest Asian ally, has also indicated that it 
is now willing to work with the Beijing-based 
institution. That is irrespective of the fact that 
Japan at the same time controls the US-backed 
rival Asian Development Bank. 
 
The US played its diplomatic hand badly. 
China invested in the IMF in response to the 
2007–2008 financial and economic crises, but it 
received little in return as the US Congress 
refused to deliver on the agreed deal of 
Chinese cash for voice and voting reforms.  
 
The decision by the UK, Germany and France 
to join the AIIB as founding members was a 
blow to the US, which has been so well in 
control of the world‘s financial system since 
1944. The full repercussions will be known 
only in another ten or 20 years, but this 
development may one day be seen to mark the 
beginning of the end of the US Dollar 
supremacy.  
 
The AIIB‘s establishment would seem a natural 
development against the background of the 
lack of progress in the ratification by the US 
Congress of the reforms which would have 
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given emerging market countries a greater say in 
the running of the IMF. Along with the AIIB, 
there is also the New Development Bank (widely 
known as the ‗BRICS Bank‘) jointly founded 
with Russia, India, Brazil and South Africa and 
located in Shanghai. Then there is a planned 
IMF-style contingent reserve facility, together 
with a further development bank linked to the 
Shanghai Co-operation Organization, a six-
country Eurasian political, economic and 
military grouping dominated by China and 
Russia. 
 
Then there are the Renminbi and capital 
controls. The International Monetary Fund‘s 
executive board approval to include the Chinese 
currency in the Special Drawing Right basket 
seems to be having limited success because of 
the Renminbi‘s and economic weakness. Capital 
outflows due to concerns about China‘s 
economic performance have led to significant 
depreciation of the currency. 
  
From June 2014, when Chinese currency 
reserves were US$ 4 trillion, reserves have 
decreased to about US$ 3 trillion in December 
2016, which is a five-year low. By adding to 
restrictive inbound capital controls, China is 
imposing increasingly tougher outbound capital 
controls as well as exchange controls to prevent 
further depreciation. Managing a currency‘s 
exchange rate while allowing free flow of capital 
is unsustainable. The obvious answer would be a 
free float. China fears that could lead to sharp 
depreciation, and economic—and consequently, 
political—instability.4 
 
The internationalization process is complicated 
by the weakening of the Renminbi since 2015, 
which has resulted in a reversal of market 
dynamics. Previously, expectations that China‘s 
currency would appreciate encouraged 
international investors to hold Renminbi-
denominated assets. However, as these 
expectations have faded, the prospect of the 
Renminbi depreciating against traditional reserve 
currencies such as the US dollar means that 
demand for Renminbi-denominated liabilities is 
set to increase instead. 
 
Chinese foreign direct investment associated 
with the financing of the ‗Belt and Road‘ 
initiative offers the chance to develop and 
expand the international use of the Renminbi, 
but this will require active support from Chinese 
policymakers. Such a development could also, if 
managed properly, provide a substantial boost to 
offshore Renminbi markets – especially 
London‘s. However, it remains unclear whether 
bond issuance for Belt and Road projects can 
create sufficient momentum for the offshore 
Renminbi ecosystem to become self-sustaining. 
 
WILL BREXIT DAMAGE OR ENHANCE UK-
CHINA RELATIONS? 
The 14 October 2014 was a milestone event, the 
UK treasury became the first developed nation 
to issue sovereign bonds denominated in RMB. 
Oversubscription by investors led to a final 
issuance of more than RMB 3 billion (US$490 
million) with a tightened yield of 2.7 percent. 
The majority of investors were from Asia, 
followed by European investors. This issuance 
marked another step in the maturation of the 
modest RMB 500 billion (US$81.6 billion) 
offshore RMB bond market, with these bonds 
also known as ―dim sum bonds.‖ 
 
The UK Treasury‘s issuance of RMB-denoted 
sovereign debt is a substantial move in the global 
integration of China‘s financial markets and a 
movement toward liberalizing China‘s exchange 
rate. The issuance of sovereign bonds provides a 
benchmark for risk-free rates in the selected 
currency denomination which all other bond 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
 5 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
issuances in the same currency will refer to. 
Thus, the nature of this sovereign issuance, 
particularly by a developed central bank with the 
approval of the Chinese Government, is critical 
in building the credibility of the RMB and 
facilitating the growth of foreign RMB markets. 
 
The UK‘s decision to leave the EU has created 
uncertainty not only in the UK and the EU, but 
throughout the world. China is no exception. If 
Brexit was to isolate the UK‘s economy from 
the EU, China‘s economic and financial strategy 
would be affected, at least in relation to the 
EU. Brexit may, for example, slow down China‘s 
free trade agreement negotiation process with 
the EU. Brexit is also expected to reduce 
Chinese investment in the UK, which in turn 
may open up opportunities for other EU 
countries. In the financial markets, London will 
still be attractive for China as an offshore 
Renminbi centre in Europe for the time being, 
since London is the second largest Renminbi 
offshore market after Hong Kong, and has the 
largest Renminbi pool in Europe. But with 
Brexit on the horizon, China may have to adjust 
its global Renminbi strategy.5  
  
The Brexit process will negatively impact the 
EU-China Bilateral Comprehensive Agreement 
on Investment (CAI) and added to that, the 
Dutch, French and German elections in 2017 
will certainly further slow the process. On the 
other hand, the uncertainty in relations with the 
new US President Donald Trump may 
encourage the EU and China to complete the 
CAI process sooner rather than later.    
 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRESIDENT 
TRUMP’S RESET OF US-CHINA 
RELATIONS? 
The election of Donald Trump as president to 
the United States will also have an impact on 
US-China relations. First, the US-led Trans-
Pacific Partnership, from which China was 
excluded, looks dead. Second, given that a 
Trump government plans to increase spending 
while lowering taxes, larger borrowings will be 
needed. China has been by far the largest foreign 
owner of US treasuries for several years. The 
U.S. debt to China is $1.058 trillion, as of 
December 2016. China‘s goodwill is crucial to 
issuing more debt, although, as usual in these 
cases, Beijing‘s ownership of such a large stock 
of US government bonds ensures the 
relationship is one of mutual dependence. 
 
The Dollar‘s status as the primary reserve 
currency remains. Yet last year over 22% of 
China‘s external trade was settled in RMB, well 
up from zero in 2010, while HSBC estimates it 
will shoot up to 50% in 2020. President Xi 
Jinping at the World Economic Forum in Davos 
in January 2017 defended globalization and Free 
Trade. But if China is to become a free trade 
champion—and that is indeed to be wished 
for—it must deal with several challenges. 
 
The Trump administration could quickly feel the 
full wrath of Chinese retaliation. If it follows 
through with its threats of trade actions against 
China, expect China to reciprocate with 
sanctions on US companies operating there, and 
ultimately with tariffs on US imports – hardly 
trivial considerations for a growth-starved US 
economy. Also expect China to be far less 
interested in buying Treasury debt – a potentially 
serious problem, given the expanded federal 
budget deficits that are likely under President 
Trump.6 
 
President Trump could declare China a currency 
manipulator and propose penalties if it does not 
enter into negotiations to lower its trade surplus 
with the US. China has been trying to control 
the rate of its currency's depreciation since 2014, 
and it has had a harder time keeping it stable in 
trade-weighted terms since mid-2016.  
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Policymakers have reversed previous trends of 
capital account openness and currency 
internationalization in an attempt to slow the 
pace of the RMB‘s depreciation. Additionally, 
foreign exchange reserves have depreciated as 
they attempt to support the currency. Notably, 
there are three criteria that must be met for a 
country to be labelled a currency manipulator by 
the Treasury Department. The first is a country 
must have a significant bilateral trade surplus 
with the US. Second, a country has a "material" 
currency account surplus. Third, a country is 
engaged in persistent one-sided intervention in 
the foreign exchange market.  
 
In the US Treasury semi-annual April 2017 
report, there is a "Monitoring List" of major 
trading partners that "merit attention based on 
an analysis of the three criteria. Once a country 
is added to the list, it is kept on there for at least 
two consecutive reports. China was among those 
added to the list. However, the Treasury noted 
that while it met two out of the three criteria in 
the April 2016 report (a large bilateral trade 
surplus and a current account surplus above 
3%),7 it met only one of the three criteria in the 
October report (the large bilateral trade 
surplus.)8 
 
In any case, going forward, if Trump does label 
China a "currency manipulator," the follow-up 
question becomes: how will China respond? In 
the trade policy realm, the authorities have 
signalled that they'll respond with tariffs in 
proportion to the US move. So a sector-by-
sector application of anti-dumping tariffs, for 
example, will likely be met by a similar response 
from China. An across-the-board tariff on all 
imports from China would likely be met by a 
similar response on the Chinese side. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Chinese government has made great strides 
in its ambition to turn the Renminbi into a 
global reserve currency. The slowdown and 
structural shift in its domestic economy 
combined with recent financial and political 
turmoil across Europe and the US has created a 
complex web of challenges. 
 
The Chinese economy will need to navigate the 
waters of transitioning from an export-led 
investment driven economy to a consumption-
based services-oriented one. In the short term 
this can only come about with some loss in 
output growth momentum. The key challenge 
will be to keep up the overall momentum 
through a careful steering of macroeconomic 
and structural policies. If this is not achieved and 
policy failures lead to a derailment in the 
fundamentals of the Chinese economy, the very 
basis for a successful internationalisation of the 
Renminbi will be undermined. 
 
The Trump administration is proposing a budget 
it says will increase defence spending by $54 
billion which will certainly put pressure on 
China. China‘s policymakers already have their 
work cut out tackling a host of problems such as 
its housing boom, the explosion of household 
and corporate debt and steep industrial 
overcapacity remain deeply challenging. 
 
The importance of Europe to China‘s economy 
is unquestionable. So Brexit is an unwelcomed 
event which will weaken the European Union. 
China will just have to grin and bear any 
potential downturn from its European trade. But 
if the Euro‘s survival looks in doubt, protecting 
the nation‘s US$3 trillion official currency 
reserves from any subsequent exchange rate 
fallout is paramount. The People‘s Bank of 
China will be keeping an eye on developments 
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and undertaking measures to protect their 
reserves denominated in Euros. 
 
All these events will challenge China‘s reserve 
currency ambitions and the government will 
have to adapt its strategies in order to keep its 
vision for a truly global Renminbi on course.  
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DIVERSITY IN CAPABILITIES 
All European countries are strong in what could 
be called ‗soft military power‘: capabilities 
required for stabilisation operations, working 
together with civilian actors and local authorities 
to restore failed states and help them to 
transition into functioning societies. But the 
higher in the spectrum, the bigger European 
shortfalls become. Partly, this is caused by a lack 
of enablers, such as strategic reconnaissance and 
intelligence, air-to-air refuelling and 
interoperable command and control capabilities. 
Equally, European countries have limited 
amounts of expensive precision munitions. 
There is a lack of adequate numbers of 
platforms able to deliver heavy fire power – in 
particular land-based, both for combat units and 
combat support units. 
 
For more than two decades European countries 
have reduced their heavy units and restructured 
to rapidly deployable and lightly armed, infantry-
based forces. It was the right thing to do in 
order to be able to carry out crisis management 
operations in the Balkans during the 1990s and, 
later on, even further away in the Middle East 
and Africa. The new security environment asks 
for more mixed forces, still with rapidly 
deployable components in order to reinforce  
NATO‘s borders quickly or to intervene outside 
Europe when needed – but also with more 
stronger components able to deter or, when 
